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Alliances expand by the time-tested method of adding members who share the same 
interests and values. Forming and joining these alliances always demands some resources 
allocated from the countries who want to commit themselves to participation in them. Security, 
which results from defense, is not a free good in economic terms. As with all expenditures, 
defense expenditures involve a trade off of other goods and services, raising controversies about 
military versus social-welfare spending and whether defense is a benefit or burden to an 
economy.1 
The twelve countries that formed NATO in 1949, agreed, by signing the North Atlantic 
Treaty that:  
! They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their 
peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.  
! They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.2  
NATO eventually expanded its membership and the alliance was joined by other 
countries who wanted to share this common feeling of security and to contribute to trans-Atlantic 
security: Greece and Turkey (1952), West Germany (1955) and Spain (1982).   In fact, the 
defense spending of NATO members represented their response to the perceived threat from the 
Soviet Union and its allies in the Warsaw Pact.3 
After the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and the end of the Cold War, the borders and 
defense lines between the opposing sides were erased. Countries from the former Warsaw Pact 
wanted to join NATO to share the perceived protection and benefits of membership of the 
alliance as security challenges arose. This group included Hungary, the Czech Republic and 
Poland in 1999; and Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania in 
2004.  
NATO is described as “a voluntary international club” which specializes in providing 
collective defense, a public good. Nations will join the club and remain members so long as 
membership is expected to be worthwhile, benefits exceed costs.4  It means that all countries who 
join the “club” anticipate that the benefits received outweigh the costs incurred.   However, an 
alliance built on the premise that all members expect to benefit more ,receive more security and 
stability, then they contribute will eventually collapse. That is why several countries are willing 
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to over contribute, get less than they contributed, in order to achieve other certain intangible 
benefits such as building trust and relationships, and expanding their influence and culture. 
NATO members contribute to the Alliance in various ways. The most significant means 
by far is through funding and the deployment of their respective armed forces in support of 
NATO missions.  
Over the past decade, as the alliance has undertaken enlargement, current member 
countries have been providing bilateral assistance to prospective future members. 
Defense analysts point out that the NATO allies also contribute to mutual security 
in many other ways.5 
However, intangibles are difficult to account for and a nation’s contribution to an 
alliance, its burden sharing measure, is still best measured in monetary, military and tangible 
resources.6  
 A variety of indicators to measure burden sharing can be formulated and classified into 
the following categories: 
1. Military quantitative: size of the armed forces, population pool for conscription, 
number of military equipment available; 
2. Military qualitative: quality of the armed forces, training, funding and readiness 
levels of the respective units, quality and effectiveness of the military equipment 
available to fulfill mission goals; 
3. Civil quantitative: contribution to humanitarian missions, economic aid provided, 
assistance to refugees; 
4. Civil qualitative indicators: quality of the help provided, impact and effectiveness 
of the contribution. 
The military indicators distinguish between expenditures, the various components of 
defense budgets, national contributions to NATO, final outputs in the form of force 
effectiveness, and contributions to peacekeeping. Data on some of these indicators are either not 
available in the public domain or hard to quantify, such as force effectiveness.  
Where data are available, the spending levels on the various categories need to be 
placed in perspective. For example, contributions to NATO common funding (e.g. 
infrastructure) average less than 1% of total NATO defense spending: hence, over 
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contributing to common funding does not make up for under contributing to 
defense, because common funding is so small.7 
Military spending as a share of Gross Domestic Product (ME/GDP) is the most 
commonly used measure of defense burdens; however, it has limitations. Nations can differ in 
their definition of defense spending choosing to include or exclude certain expense such as 
pensions or research and development.  In addition, some countries rely on conscript forces so 
that their defense budgets underestimate their defense burdens as reflected by the opportunity 
costs of using troops.   
There are several more limitations on the usage of this measure of a nation’s contribution 
to defense spending: Countries have different mixes of public and country-specific defense 
forces. Nations might apply the economic principle of substitution using alternative methods of 
providing protection, reflecting each nation’s comparative advantage in resources.  Differences 
are also likely to arise in the efficiency with which various nations convert defense expenditures 
into combat-effective armed forces. Some nations might have highly inefficient forces which 
would not be evident from ME/GDP measures, although the impact on force effectiveness might 
be assessed by examining various components of the defense budget.  Various quantitative 
indicators show the strength of a nation’s commitment to NATO as reflected in its willingness to 
support the alliance leader such as basing and over flight rights.8  Despite its shortcomings, 
defense spending as a share of Gross Domestic Product remains the most commonly used 
measure of defense burdens. 
 
NATO ENLARGEMENT PROCESS 
The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a 
position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of 
the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Article 10, The North Atlantic Treaty 
Washington DC, 4 April 1949  
Since 1949, the number of NATO member countries has increased from the twelve 
founding countries to 28 following two major enlargements after the Cold War. The Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland joined the Alliance in March 1999, following an invitation issued 
at the 1997 Madrid Summit Meeting; while Latvia, Estonia Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, 
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Lithuania and Slovakia joined in 2004, after receiving the invitation at the 2002 Prague Summit 
Meeting.9  
Already since the Washington Summit Meeting in April 1999 NATO leaders 
underlined the continuing openness of the Alliance to further new members and 
pledged that NATO would continue to welcome new members in a position to 
further the principles of the Treaty and contribute to peace and security in the 
Euro-Atlantic area.10  
Even after these large accessions, which more than doubled the original number of 
members, NATO continues to adhere to the openness policy adopted in 1999; the member states 
agreed that NATO enlargement is an ongoing process, not a single event.11  
Several other countries subsequently have expressed their willingness to join NATO and 
began NATO accession preparation procedures for full fledged membership: Albania, Croatia 
and FYROM. Albania and Croatia joined in 2009 and FYROM’s accession remains unresolved. 
To facilitate the accession of new members into NATO, the alliance developed specific 
plans to accommodate a smooth introduction of the new members into the alliance.  These tools 
include the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Membership Action Plan (MAP). 
 
Table 1: NATO Accession Mechanisms12 
 
COUNTRY PFP MAP MEMBERSHIP 
Poland 1994 - 1999 
Hungary 1994 - 1999 
Czech Republic 1994 - 1999 
Latvia 1994 1999 2004 
Lithuania 1994 1999 2004 
Estonia 1994 1999 2004 
Albania 1994 2002 2009 
Croatia 2000 2002 2009 
FYROM 1995 1999 Not invited to join, until 
official name issues with 
Greece are solved 
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At the Brussels Summit in 1994, NATO leaders reaffirmed that the alliance still has an 
open door policy to European states that follow the principles of the Washington Treaty and 
contribute to security in the North Atlantic area. Building on 
this, in December 1994, the Alliance Foreign Ministers determined the criteria for future 
admissions into the Alliance.  These conditions were examined by the Allies in 1995.13 A study 
was completed after the meeting and the resulting “Study on NATO Enlargement” was shared 
with interested Partner countries in September 1995 and made public. These guidelines are still 
applicable to NATO enlargements today.  
New members will be accepted according to the Article 10 prerequisites and they will 
become full-fledged members after completing certain procedures and fulfilling certain 
benchmarks. At the same time countries must conform to all NATO requirements in practice and 
not only on paper - they must have real capabilities. Countries that have internal or external 
disputes (democracy issues, unsolved border disputes etc.) should solve them by peaceful means 
before becoming members.  
Ultimately, the Study concluded, Allies would decide by consensus whether to 
invite each new member to join, basing their decision on their judgment - at the 
time such a decision has to be made - of whether the membership of a specific 
country would contribute to security and stability in the North Atlantic area or 
not. No country outside the Alliance has a veto or ‘droit de regard’ over the 
process of enlargement or decisions relating to it.14  
 
Mechanisms of Enlargement 
PfP is an important initiative introduced by NATO at the January 1994 Brussels Summit 
of the North Atlantic Council. The aim of the Partnership is to enhance stability and security 
throughout Europe. NATO addressed the PfP Invitation to all states participating in the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council and in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe who 
were interested, able and of course willing to contribute to the alliance. The invitation was 
accepted by a total of 33 countries. The activities which each Partner undertakes in support of 
NATO are based on jointly defined Individual Partnership Programs. The PfP focuses primarily 
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on defense related cooperation, but it also goes beyond dialogue and cooperation in the military 
and defense field in order to forge real partnerships between Partner countries and NATO.15  
 The NATO enlargement process, after the end of the Cold War, can be divided into five 
stages. Initially, under PfP, military cooperation is initiated between the alliance and the 
applicant nation.  This first stage of the accession process is primarily a declaration of intent 
from the applicant and the realignment of common defense and security directions.  Even though 
this step is one of the easiest, there are cases when countries did not receive the “green light” 
from NATO.  For instance, Croatia was not able to join PfP until May 2000, when the 
government started an internal democratization process.16  
The first stage is followed by a step up in PfP cooperation that may include a formulation 
of a request for membership by the country.17  This second stage of the accession procedure 
signals that the country is ready to develop and strengthen its relationship to NATO, potentially 
culminating in full NATO membership. However, some countries end their commitment at this 
stage.  For example, Switzerland has been active in non-military PfP activities for years, 
signaling its desire to cooperate with but not join NATO.18 
Stage three is the midpoint of the accession procedure when the military cooperation 
grows into an eventual membership to NATO. This constitutes a process of consensus building 
within NATO regarding the given country’s eligibility for consideration for membership and 
detailed discussion of the potential accession. In Stage two, a country can state whether it wants 
to join NATO, but in Stage three it is up to NATO to accept a country into the alliance. The 
MAP is the tool for declaring such intent.  It transforms the vision of NATO membership into 
reality. MAP process was started in April 1999 to assist those countries, mostly those countries 
that joined NATO in 2004, who wish to join the Alliance in their preparations by providing 
advice, assistance and practical support on all aspects of NATO membership. Its main features 
are: the submission by aspiring members of individual annual national programs on their 
preparations for possible future membership, covering political, economic, defense, resource, 
security and legal aspects; a focused and candid feedback mechanism on aspirant countries' 
progress on their programs that includes both political and technical advice, as well as annual 
meetings to assess progress; a clearing house to help coordinate assistance by NATO and by 
 8
member states to aspirant countries in the defense/military field; a defense planning approach for 
aspirants which includes elaboration and review of agreed planning targets.19 
Aspirant countries are expected to achieve certain goals not only in the military field but 
also in the political and economic fields. These non military goals include settling any 
international, ethnic or external territorial disputes by peaceful means; demonstrating a 
commitment to the rule of law and human rights; establishing democratic control of their armed 
forces; and promoting stability and well-being through economic liberty, social justice and 
environmental responsibility.20  
Full participation in PfP is an essential component, because through their individual PfP 
programs which specifically include goals for each country, aspirants can focus on essential 
membership related issues. Partnership Goals for aspirants include planning targets covering 
those areas which are most directly relevant for nations aspiring to NATO membership.21  At this 
point, the aspirant country commits sufficient resources to defense to meet the commitments that 
future membership would bring in terms of collective NATO undertakings.22   In addition, 
Security issues center on the need for aspirant countries to make sure that procedures are in place 
to ensure the security of sensitive information.   Legal aspects address the need for aspirants to 
ensure that legal arrangements and agreements which govern cooperation within NATO are 
compatible with domestic legislation.23 
Placing a country in the third stage of the NATO accession process is usually done by a 
public statement from the NATO side. Even though Ukraine and Finland actively participated in 
Stage 2, neither country advanced to the third stage. 
 Stage four starts when the countries’ aspiration efforts are recognized by NATO and the 
intra alliance discussion on the countries’ weaknesses starts. Countries then are evaluated 
compared to the criteria listed in the 1995 NATO Enlargement study: Do they meet the criteria 
or not?  
 Then in multilateral and bilateral meetings, at various levels, between the aspirant and 
NATO country representatives, a schedule is agreed for the country specific MAP process – to 
correct certain weaknesses before NATO accession in order to strengthen the candidacy. When 
the minimum requirements are met, the accession process goes to its final stage. 
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Stage five is the final stage of the NATO accession process where the country receives an 
official invitation to join NATO. Such an invitation can be achieved only after an intra-alliance 
bargaining procedure, and consensus recognition among NATO members that the aspirant 
country has fulfilled Stage 4 minimum requirements and is ready to join NATO.24 
 
COUNTRY ANALYSIS 
Visegrad: Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary25 
Poland 
At the end of the Second World War, Poland’s occupation by the Red Army led to 
establishment of a pro-Soviet regime which lasted until 1989.26 After the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, Poland, a founding member of the Warsaw pact,27 declared its interest in joining NATO 
in 1991.28  In preparation, Poland joined the PfP program in 1994, five years prior to NATO 
membership, and began to modernize its armed forces according to NATO standards. In 1999, 
Poland joined the North Atlantic Treaty organization during a challenging period for NATO.  
The Alliance was facing major changes and challenges: enlargement, new threats, new missions, 
new technology, and declining defense budgets.29  
During the Cold War in 1988, the Polish armed forces were second in size only to 
the USSR in the Warsaw Pact, numbering 897,000 with 406,000 active and 491,000 reserves.  
By 1992, the number dropped to 731,500 with 296,500 active and 435,000 reserves.30 The force 
reductions came under the terms of a 1991 plan with NATO and the EU.31 Currently the Armed 
Forces in Poland conscript 67,500 persons annually, around 40 per cent of the total number of 
the personnel, and plans are to reduce the number of conscripts to 58,500 by 2008.  The intention 
is to increase the share of volunteers in the armed forces to 65 percent by 2010. In addition, 
Poland has already amended the conscript service time in the armed forces from 12 to 9 months.  
The drive toward fully professional armed forces should be complete in 2012, when conscription 
will be suspended.  
At the end of the Cold War, Poland was left with a broken economy and armed 
forces in urgent need of transformation.32 The newly democratic country was forced to decrease 
the portion of military expenditures in the state budget to address its economic trouble. From 
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1990 to 1991 alone, the decrease was 1,847 million dollars or 31.7%. But after 1994, it is 
possible to see a gradual increase in Polish military expenditures in terms of dollars spent, 
because Poland joined the PfP initiative as a stepping stone to NATO membership. 
 
Table 2: Defense burden (ME/GDP %)33 
 Visegrad Baltic Adriatic 
Year Poland Czech Hungary Latvia Estonia Lithuania Albania Croatia FYROM
1988 2.6  3.8e    5.6   
1989 1.9  3.1e    5.2   
1990 2.8  2.8e    5.9   
1991 2.4  2.4e    na   
1992 2.4  2.4  0.5  4.9e 7.8e  
1993 2.7  2.2 0.7 0.8 0.6e 3.2 10e  
1994 2.4p 2.3p 2.1p 0.8p 1.0p 0.4ep 2.5p 11.1e  
1995 2.0 1.9 1.6 0.9 1.0 0.4e 2.1 11e p 
1996 2.0 1.8 1.5 0.7 0.9 0.4e 1.4 9.8e 3.0 
1997 2.0 1.7 1.7 0.6 1.1 0.6e 1.3 8.9e 2.2 
1998 2.0 1.9 1.5 0.6 1.1 1.0e 1.2 6.6e 2.2 
1999 1.9n 2.0n 1.7n 0.8a 1.3a 0.9ea 1.2 5.2e 1.8a 
2000 1.8 2.0 1.7 0.9 1.4 1.4e 1.2 3.6ep 1.9 
2001 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.0 1.5 1.3e 1.3 3.2e 6.6 
2002 1.9 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.4e 1.3a 3.2ea 2.8 
2003 1.9 2.1 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.4 1.3 2.4e 2.5 
2004 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.3n 1.5n 1.4n 1.4 2.0 2.5 
2005 1.8 1.8 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.2 1.3 1.9 2.2 
2006 1.8 1.7 1.2 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.6 1.9 2.0 





The defense burden drops significantly after the end of the Cold War. During the 
PfP phase, Poland maintains ME/GDP at 2% as required by NATO.  Subsequent to joining, the 




After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Czech Republic was among the countries that 
left the influence sphere of Russia and joined NATO and the European Union. Lodged firmly in 
the memory of the population was 1968, when an invasion by Warsaw Pact troops ended the 
efforts of the country's leaders to liberalize Communist Party rule and create "socialism with a 
human face".34   
The Czech Republic was the larger of two countries to emerge from the breakup of the 
former Czechoslovakia on 1 January 1993; this so called "velvet divorce" formed the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia. A year later, after the “velvet divorce,” the Czech Republic joined the 
European Union,35 and in 1999, NATO. As with other former Eastern bloc countries during the 
1990s, the Czech Republic struggled to adapt its economy to the new situation.36  
During the last years of the Warsaw Pact there were approximately 201,000 
personnel on active duty in the CSLA , Czechoslovak People's Army, in 1987, about 145,000, 72 
percent of whom served in the ground forces. Of these, about 100,000 were conscripts.37  
But the Czech military underwent several transformation procedures in the 1990s, 
personnel end-strength was cut from 106,101 in 1991 to 67,702 in 1995.38  In 1994, the Czech 
Republic joined the Partnership for Peace Program, which helped the Czech armed forces to 
adopt NATO procedures and NATO standards and increased interoperability with NATO forces. 
The Czech Republic completed its accession talks and became a NATO member, together with 
Hungary and Poland, on 12 March 1999.  
However, the armed forces remained larger than necessary for the new situation. 
For instance, in 1997 the Defense Ministry still employed more than 80,000 persons, or 25,000 
more than planned in the first reform concept approved in 1993. In addition, between 1996 and 
1998, according to various doctrinal documents, army development concepts and acquisition 
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plans were made in a conceptual vacuum. This was because older, high-level strategic 
documents were no longer valid and new reviews were only approved at the beginning of 1999.39 
The low speed of military reforms can be traced back to the fact that, during the 
1990s, the main priority of the government was the improvement of economic situation due to 
the slow GDP growth.  In the middle of  2001, the government approved terms of reference for 
what was supposed to be the last major reform of the Czech Army, a shift toward a professional 
force in the beginning of 2005.40   Reductions in armed forces personnel strength continued and 
in 2006 the Czech army had the size of 26,000 military personnel.41 
 In the years prior to accession, the average defense burden for the republic was around 




In 1956 Hungary, as the rest of Eastern Europe, fell under communist rule. Hungary 
subsequently revolted and announced its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. This announcement 
was met with a massive military intervention by Moscow. However, the Hungarian government 
under the leadership of Janos Kadar in 1968 was allowed to liberalize its economy.  This 
liberalization was named the "Goulash Communism."42  In 1990, Hungary held its first 
multiparty elections, started the transition to a free market economy, and joined the European 
Union in 1994.  The fact that “Goulash Communism” was already in place since the 1970s 
smoothed the country’s transition to a market economy. Within four years of the collapse of 
communism, nearly half of the country's economic enterprises had been transferred to the private 
sector, and by 1998 Hungary was attracting nearly half of all foreign direct investment in its 
region.43 In 1999, Hungary joined NATO, together with Poland and the Czech Republic. 
During the Cold War, the Hungarian armed forces were one of the smallest in the 
Warsaw Pact.  Approximately 100,000 personnel were on active duty in the Hungarian People’s 
Army in 1988, of which about 64,000 were conscripts.44 One of the main reasons for the small 
force was that 200,000 Soviet Army troops were stationed in the country, filling many of 
Hungary’s defense needs by their presence. Hungary ranked last, along with Bulgaria and 
Romania, in the number of military helicopters, and only Romania had fewer tanks.  
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During the last decade, the Hungarian army underwent a transformation that cut 
its armed forces from 121,600 to 74,463 in 1996.45  Hungary finished its armed forces 
transformation in 2004, switching to a professional military at a current level of 23,000 
personnel.46 Even though Hungary’s forces were relatively ineffective compared to other former 
Warsaw Pact countries and higher levels of investment were needed to rebuild the Hungarian 
armed forces, this was reflected in the defense burden measures for the country.  In the years 
after independence and before PfP, Hungary’s defense burden was on average 2.3 percent.  
During PfP, the average was 1.6 percent and after accession it drops to 1.4 percent. 
 
 
Baltic Countries: Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania 
The Baltic countries have always been at the crossroads of interests of major countries in 
Europe, Russia and Germany in recent memory, Poland and Sweden in previous centuries. They 
became independent states for the first time after the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1918. 
Then the countries enjoyed a brief spell of independence which lasted for 22 years.  This period 
was ended by Soviet occupation in 1940, an occupation that lasted until the USSR’s collapse in 
1991. 
After the collapse of the USSR, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania sought an international 
mechanism which would provide them safety and security. All three countries declared 
membership in NATO and EU to be a primary goal of their foreign policies and planned to join 
as early as possible. But it was a long road for the Baltic countries to travel, as 50 years of Soviet 
occupation had left scars on the economies of the three countries and their readiness to take 
security related responsibilities in the international area.47  
In order to make the accession to both organizations harder, Russia stated its opposition 
to the membership of the three Baltic countries in the EU and NATO. This made the issue of 
accession not only dependent on the success of the reforms and progress done by the countries, 
but also on political bargaining and negotiation among Russia, NATO and EU officials at the 




After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Latvia had no defense forces so there was 
a need to build a new defense system from scratch. On 24 January 1991, the Public Security 
Department was established, but the specific defense institutions began to form after the real 
restoration of independence.48 The first step was the establishment of the Ministry of Defense in 
November 1991 and development of the first draft structure of the armed forces. At this time 
other institutions, such as the State Defense Forces, the National Academy of Defense and other 
entities related to state defense, were subordinated directly to the Ministry of Defense.49  
Until 1994, the Latvian armed forces totaled 6,600 soldiers, including 1,650 in the army, 
630 in the navy, 180 in the air force, and 4,140 in the border guard. Plans called for 9,000 active 
members in the armed forces. In addition, the security service of the Ministry of Interior and the 
reserve Home Guard—totaling 17,000 members—served as a national guard and assisted the 
border guard and the police.50 
A conscript based system was established for a 15 year period, ending in 2007.  This 
resulted in 40,718 soldiers serving in the armed forces. Latvia revised its National Defense 
Concept in 2003, changing emphasis from territorial defense with a conscript base to an all 
volunteer force with the main focus on participation in collective defense. The changes in the 
armed forces were implemented for several reasons: NATO membership and participation of 
Latvian armed forces in NATO operations; A need to improve Latvia’s host-nation capabilities; 
Changes in the international situation: Shift from territorial defense forces to developing force 
components for NATO forces; Taking into account the opportunity costs of conscript-based 
armed forces, it was decided to use more efficient, well-equipped professional units.  The 
transition to a fully professional force of approximately 5,000 soldiers was finished in 2007.51  
In 1994, Latvia joined the PfP framework in order to improve its 
interoperability with NATO forces.  Its ME/GDP averaged 0.7 percent during its PfP phase and 
increased to 1.2 percent during MAP.  After accession, the defense burden stabilized at 1.3 







Estonia mirrored the other post-USSR Baltic countries in the need to rebuild its armed 
forces from scratch. The government took swift measures to build up its defense forces, so much 
so that by 1994 the Estonian Defense Forces numbered about 3,000,  a 2,500-member army a 
500-member navy.52  There was also a 6,000-member reserve militia, known as the Defense 
League, a 2,000-member paramilitary border guard under the command of the Ministry of 
Interior, and a maritime border guard, which also functioned as a coast guard.53 To further stress 
the importance of national defense, the Estonian parliament in March 1994 adopted a law 
mandating 8 to 12 months of military service for all male citizens aged 19 to 27 years. 
In 2006, Estonia reported to NATO armed forces strength of 5,000 military personnel,54 
but currently the average size of the Estonian Regular Armed Forces is about 3,800; 3,300 in the 
Army; 300 in the Navy; 200 in the Air Force. The forces include about 1,500 conscripts. The 
Voluntary Defense League also has about 8,000 members. The planned size of the operational 
structure is 16,000 personnel.55 
Estonia joined PfP in 1994, and thereby gaining specific partnership goals which needed 
to be accomplished before talks on possible NATO membership could start. Starting from 1994, 
Estonia spent on average of 1 percent of GDP on military expenditures, but as with Latvia and 
Lithuania never reached the 2 percent benchmark.  Estonia’s average burden increased to 1.5 




After independence on 11 March 1990, one of the major priorities of the Lithuanian 
government was reestablishment of the armed forces as Soviet army forces deployed in 
Lithuania, approximately 34,600 troops withdrew.56 By 1994, Lithuania was able to field a force 
numbering about 8,900 including a 4,300-member army, 350-member navy, 250-member air 
force, and 4,000-member border guard. In addition, a coast guard, modeled on the United States 
Coast Guard, and a 12,000-member Home Guard force were established.57   Currently, the 
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Lithuanian Armed Forces are a conscript based armed force of 11,000 personnel.58 It is currently 
the largest military among the Baltic countries.59  
After Lithuania joined the PfP program in 1994, it allocated on average 0.6 percent of 
GDP to the military.  After joining the MAP process in 1999, Lithuania increased its average 
military expenditure to 1.3 percent of GDP. After accession to NATO, Lithuania maintained 1.3 




The country declared independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1912 but was occupied 
in 1939 by Italy. Later, it was taken over by communist partisans in 1944 and became a member 
of the Eastern bloc.  Once established, Albania’s governing communist regime was very 
xenophobic. It was allied with the USSR until 1960 when Albania left the Warsaw Pact and 
thereafter with China, until 1978.  
During the years of the Cold War, Albania isolated itself from the rest of the world and 
relied on its own capabilities to defend itself. In 1992, the total number of the Albanian armed 
forces was estimated to be 48,000 men, of which 50% were conscripts. The force structure was 
copied from the Red Army model, with realignment to the Chinese model after 1961.60 
Albania finally opened to other countries in the 1990s and started a transition to a 
democratic society, but the transformation was a hard one as successive governments have tried 
to deal with high unemployment, widespread corruption, powerful organized crime networks, 
and combative political opponents.61  
Albania’s first request to join NATO came in 1992, immediately after the country’s first 
multiparty elections.  Albania since then continued to develop and expand relations with NATO 
member countries.  Albania was mostly neutral during the Yugoslavian wars in the Balkans in 
the 1990s, though Albanian forces did join the NATO led SFOR peacekeeping force in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina in 1996. The cooperation with NATO went further in 1999, when NATO 
established a logistical base in Tirana to support Allied operations in Kosovo.62   In 2002, the base 
was transformed into NATO Headquarters in Tirana.63 
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Albania joined NATO’s ‘PfP Initiative in February 1994, and is a member of the US 
Adriatic Charter of Partnership, signed in Tirana in 2003.64  Albania entered MAP in 1999 and 
was officially invited to join NATO during the Bucharest summit on April 2-4, 2008.65  Albania 
struggled economically during the 1990s, but continued to sustain high numbers of military 
personnel due to the Yugoslavian wars raging in neighboring countries. Only in 2002 did the 
Albanian military launch a ten year transformation program under the guidance of the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DOD) to trim down and thoroughly modernize its current standing force 
of more than 30,000 troops. The Albanian army participates in the peacekeeping missions in 
Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq. The total strength of the armed forces is estimated currently at 
21,500.66 
Albania itself saw its membership in NATO as an opportunity to spread NATO’s 
influence in southeastern Europe. In its MAP, Albania focused on: Improving public order  and 
fighting against corruption; Encouraging and developing respect for human rights; Strengthening 
democratic institutions and their role in society; Establishing an efficient public administration 
system; Strengthening civilian democratic control over the armed forces;  Maintaining economic 
growth particularly in privatization; Continuing good neighbor policies and making use of 
regional programs; Adapting legislation compatible with NATO; Guarantying internal control of 
weapons and the disarmament process.67 
In the years leading up to PfP, Albania maintained an average defense burden of 4.7 
percent.  This declined to 1.5 percent during PfP and further to 1.3 percent during MAP.  Albania 




Croatia was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire until the end of the World War I.  It 
then became a part of the Yugoslavian kingdom and, after the Second World War; Croatia 
became a part of Yugoslavia, an independent communist country. This unification lasted until 
1991, when Croatia declared its independence.  Following independence, Croatia contended with 
a domestic rebellion supported by the Yugoslav People’s Army. It took four years before 
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occupying Serb armies were cleared from the territory of Croatia. Under UN supervision, the last 
Serb-held enclave in eastern Slavonia was returned to Croatia in 1998.68  
Croatia focused on development of its economy, which was heavily damaged during the 
early 1990s and experienced growth only after 1995. At the same time, Croatia paid attention to 
the transformation of its armed forces within the frameworks and tools offered by NATO.69  
Since declaration of independence, Croatia has established relations with NATO and 
joined the PfP process in 2000 and the MAP process in 2002. Croatia was invited, together with 
Albania, to join NATO in April 2008.70 After independence, Croatia was forced to hastily 
establish its armed forces since the young country needed them right from the beginning as it 
fought a four-year war.71  
In the mid 1990s it was estimated that Croatia had 180,000 men in its armed 
forces.72 By 2002 at the end of hostilities, the Croatian forces were reduced to 51,000 active 
military personnel and 140,000 reserves.73  According to the latest plans, the Croatian Armed 
Forces will be stabilized at 16,000 from the current 25,000.74 In early 2008, Croatia transitioned 
to a professional military. 
Croatia has also been contributing to NATO mission such as peacekeeping efforts 
in Afghanistan since 2003. Croatia also actively cooperates with other Adriatic countries in the 
military field, including deployment of a joint medical unit with Albania and FYROM to 
Afghanistan.75  
In the years before joining the PfP and potentially due to its conflict with Serbia, 
Croatia average defense burden was 8.8.  The defense share of GDP dropped to 3.4 percent 
between 2000 and 2002 during the PfP phase.  Croatia’s defense burden further dropped to an 




FYROM gained independence from Yugoslavia in 1991 in a peaceful way and in contrast 
to the other Yugoslavian republics was spared hostilities during the 1990s.  However, the country 
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was challenged in 2001 when the Albanian minority in the country demanded their rights. NATO 
stepped in to end the fighting.76 Of more serious concern is the FYROM dispute with Greece 
regarding recognition of the country under its current official name even though the U.S. has 
referred to the country as the Republic of Macedonia since 2004.77  This has prevented the 
country from receiving an invitation to join NATO in April 2008.78  
When FYROM declared its independence in 1991, its armed forces consisted simply of 
local militia and old equipment left by the Yugoslav People’s Army.  In 1992, the Armed Forces 
of the Macedonian Republic were formed.  FYROM was not involved in the Yugoslav wars in 
the 1990s, and therefore the build up of the armed forces was slower than in other former 
Yugoslavian republics.  Under the last reforms in the Ministry of Defense and the armed forces, 
the total military strength is 12,858 soldiers, of whom 70% are professional soldiers.79 
Therefore, the country was able to gradually increase its military spending during the late 
1990s—especially when FYROM joined the MAP process in 1999. Since then, military 
expenditure has slowly increased, as FYROM has declared NATO membership to be one of the 
country’s foreign policy priorities. FYROM averaged a defense burden of 2.5 percent during the 
PfP process and increasing to 2.8 percent during MAP.  However, this increase may have been 
affected by the curious one time spike in defense expenditures.  FYROM increased its burden to 
6.6 percent in 2001 probably as a result of its dispute with the Albanian population. 





Central and Eastern European countries have undergone major changes after the end of 
the Cold War which impacted their defense expenditure behavior. There was a shift away from 
the inherited Soviet-style armed forces, especially for the Visegrad countries, to modern armed 
forces ready to jointly operate with other NATO armed forces.  
 It was widely acknowledged that these old-style armed forces were too large and that the 
country’s fledgling economies could not afford them.  The burden on the economies from 
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defense was unmanageable.80 In contrast to the Visegrad countries, the Baltic countries needed to 
establish their defense forces from scratch. This they did, mostly using the military infrastructure 
left by the Soviet Army.  
In the beginning and in the mid 1990s, the Visegrad countries made large cuts to military 
expenditures basically halving expenditures from their Cold War level. Also, similar and even 
more drastic cuts were applied to the military personnel numbers as major procurement programs 
were stopped and training levels decreased.81  The story was quite different for the Baltic 
countries there was simply nothing there to cut, as these countries had only recently regained 
their independence.  
These reforms, of course, were not easy. The issue was always there: butter or guns. As 
countries struggled economically, there was an internal fight for the scarce funds among services 
and spending categories within the military budgets.  Therefore, it is possible to argue that 
accepting the Central and Eastern European countries to NATO was more a political than a 
capabilities based decision and  
…while there is broad political support for the United States' war on terrorism, the absence of 
direct and immediate threats to the Central and Eastern European states suggests that more 
dramatic increases in defense spending are unlikely in future and Central and Eastern European 
governments face the difficult task of reconciling their limited resources available for defense 
with their commitment to participate in international peace-support operations, the declining 
operational effectiveness of the bulk of the armed forces and postponed procurement decisions.82  
This could result in a delay in development of the national armed forces, and reliance on 
NATO in cases of emergencies.  Of course, these countries have contributed their share to 
NATO international in particular the NATO led operations in the Balkans. Participation in these 
operations has contributed to the professionalization of the participating units. It may also have a 
positive trickle-down effect on the countries' armed forces more broadly, as soldiers are rotated 
into and out of the operations.83  
Most of the post-communist Central and Eastern European countries found that the 
defense transformation was more difficult and slower than expected.  Additional reforms were 
required after joining NATO.  Tools provided by NATO, PfP and MAP, were useful in 
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streamlining the transformation processes and revealing weaknesses which were remedied to 
enhance the new NATO members’ capabilities. Involvement of the new NATO members in 
NATO defense planning with the adoption of the new Strategic Concept , which launched the 
Defense Capabilities Initiative that resulted in the force goals,  also put additional stress on the 
modernization issues of the armed forces and increase of their rapid reaction time and mobility. 
In the Visegrad countries, the manpower reductions in the early 1990s were not followed 
by similar cuts in assets.  For example, the Polish armed forces were still using high maintenance 
equipment and munitions of little military and training value, such as T-55 tanks and 100 mm 
shells.84 Another problem for the armed forces were the large stockpiles of obsolete weapons 
which needed to be monitored; therefore; the governments tried to sell these stockpiles, but 
generated funds have been usually much lower than predicted.  In order to use funds more 
effectively, Central and Eastern European countries are starting to evaluate changes to the 
procurement procedures and use of outsourcing services to the private sector.85 
Several basic conclusions can be drawn and attributed to all countries which wanted to 
enter NATO after the end of the Cold War:  
! All needed to modernize and develop their militaries. 
! Modernization and development efforts of the armed forces were hampered by economic 
decline at the start of the 1990s, as countries underwent a transition from planned to market 
economies. 
! Countries that had larger armed forces and were independent during the Cold War ,Poland, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Albania, drastically decreased military expenditure in the 
early to mid 1990s. 
! Increased military spending at latter stage was due to the need to meet NATO requirements. 
! Once accepted for NATO membership, nations’ military expenditure decreased. None of the 
country groups who joined NATO on average reached the NATO informal level of ME as 2 
percent of GDP. 
! After the end of hostilities, military expenditures were cut drastically, and fell way below 2 
percent of GDP mark for Croatia. 
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! After regaining independence in 1990, the Baltic countries started to increase their military 
spending gradually 
! Croatia and FYROM spent significant amounts of GDP on development of the armed forces 
in the early 1990s, as they were involved in hostilities with their former Yugoslavian 
compatriots or had ethnic insurgencies within their territories. 
! Tools provided by NATO to aspirant countries, PfP and MAP, were useful in order to 
prepare the countries for full fledged NATO membership. 
NATO will remain a defensive alliance.  However, it is apparent that NATO is evolving and 
may be in the process of morphing into an alliance with a political emphasis.  It appears that 
NATO in the future will continue to encourage and support democratic reforms, including the 
establishment of civilian and democratic control over military forces.  NATO will increase the 
emphasis on transparency in defense planning and military budgets, thereby reinforcing 
confidence among states and reinforcing the tendency toward integration and cooperation in 
Europe. Furthermore, NATO will continue to strengthen the Alliance’s ability to contribute to 
European and international security and support peacekeeping under the United Nations or 
OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe), and it will strengthen and 
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